Fear and Ecological (in)Justice in Edvard Munch’s The Scream of Nature by Akhtar-Khavari, Afshin
Naveiñ Reet: Nordic Journal of Law and Social Research (NNJLSR) No.6 2015, pp. 93-114




Can art help us to think critically, creatively, ethically or politically about the concepts 
or ideologies within international environmental law? Scholars (e.g. Baudot 2010) have 
argued that art contributes to international politics in instrumental, extrinsic and intrinsic 
ways. Certainly, art is important – both symbolically and ideologically – in helping us to 
understand our relationship with nature by providing a richer and alternative ontological 
context. Art can singularly reflect ideas about matter and the natural environment by 
depicting these as vibrant (Bennett 2010a) and allowing us to be enchanted by them 
– not so much in a romantic sense, but rather through appreciating their ontological 
significance for our lives. 
The expression and symbolic depiction of less anthropocentric conceptions of matter 
and the natural world through art can also give real form and perspective to important 
foundational questions in international environmental law, including environmental 
and ecological justice. The doctrine of ‘ecological justice’, compared with ‘environmental 
justice’, is increasingly being used to evaluate the impact of human beings on the natural 
world (Bosselmann 2008, esp. Ch. 3; Schlosberg 2009). The term ‘environmental 
justice’ is more commonly used as a way to describe the distribution of interests that 
humans have in relation to one another regarding their use of the natural environment 
(Gonzalez 2012). Achieving ecological justice, on the other hand, requires that we take 
our presence within the natural world into account, but that it is our impact on it that has 
to be assessed in the context of ensuring justice in relation to the world of matter itself. 
Access to ecological justice, as opposed to simply environmental justice, raises important 
questions as we look to the future in the Anthropocene epoch, given that our impact on 
the natural world is no longer as benign consumers, but rather has irreversible long-term 
geological repercussions.
1 Reader in Law, Griffith Law School, Australia. Variations to a part of this paper has already 
been published as “Ecosystem services, fear and the subjects of environmental human 
rights” in A. Grear and L. Kotze (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Envi-
ronment (2015, Edward Elgar Publishing). My thanks go to the blind reviewers of this article 
who provided me with interesting ideas to think about. Additionally, I am also grateful to 
Peter Burdon, Louis Kotze, Anna Greer, Olivera Simic, Tim Peters, Chris Butler, and William 
MacNeil who all contributed in some way to this paper. 
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In this article, I argue that Edvard Munch’s painting, Der Schrei der Natur (referred to 
in English as The Scream of Nature, or simply The Scream), can be reinterpreted as a 
depiction of a personality deeply enmeshed in the fear and anxiety of the natural world 
he is experiencing. Munch’s painting provides symbolic support for and expression of the 
personal and embodied experiences of fear. In this paper, discussions of fear of the natural 
world is used to reveal the layers of emotional experiences that are important for us in 
appreciating and understanding ecological (in)justice in the Anthropocene epoch.
We are accustomed to thinking about fear simply in terms of immediate or significant 
sensorial experiences – like coming face to face with a snake – but this has simply dulled 
our capacity to appreciate nuanced cognitive and temporal dimensions of emotional 
experiences of fear. In the Anthropocene epoch, the collective impact of our experiences 
and their impact on the ecology of planet Earth are important. However, instead of 
addressing the emotional reactions to being materially embedded, we often separate 
ourselves from this situation – both cognitively and emotionally. This article argues that 
our capacity to appreciate the kind of ecological justice that is needed in the Anthropocene 
epoch requires us to pay closer attention to our emotional experiences – particularly fear. 
In this context, Munch’s painting provides intrinsic symbolic support for and expression 
of the potential of fear to expose the reality of the impact of ecological injustice on human 
beings. 
Part I - Fear and ecological justice
Emotions in a world of matter
Over the last few years, the idea of the Anthropocene epoch has been taken increasingly 
seriously (Crutzen 2002; Robin and Steffen 2007; Steffen, Crutzen & McNeill 2007). The 
concept of the Anthropocene epoch is used in the geological sciences to describe the end 
of the Holocene epoch, which was an interglacial break within a much wider geological 
period known as the Quaternary (Whitehead 2014). The Anthropocene epoch represents 
the idea that human beings are now central to determining how earth systems function 
(Steffen, Crutzen & McNeill 2007). For instance, carbon dioxide emissions influence 
the biosphere and impact climate systems. Taken alone, the idea of the Anthropocene 
epoch does not necessarily have ethical implications for human beings’ centrality in the 
functioning of various earth systems; however, in scientific terms, it identifies what the 
social science scholars have been describing as the dramatic, catastrophic and dire impact 
of human beings on the natural world (e.g. McKibben 1989). 
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Our impact on earth Systems and the natural environment more generally has resulted in 
a growing number of scholars talking about establishing a robust reciprocal partnership 
or symbiotic relationship with the natural environment around us. These discussions are 
complicated and sometimes thwarted by the deployment of concepts that often simply 
mediate or facilitate what is desirable for human welfare. Concepts used in environmental 
law, like ‘conservation’, ‘preservation’ and ‘protection’, establish a hierarchical, controlling 
and normative relationship with nature, which ultimately protects and benefits human 
populations. Even popular concepts like ecosystem services, which seek to value nature’s 
contribution, do so in the context of their significance for human welfare rather than for 
earth Systems more generally. 
Concepts that have a controlling or regulating element or dimension to them traditionally 
have sat alongside and in opposition to notions of the ‘wild’ or ‘wildness’ (Turner 1996, 
1998). Wild approaches to the natural environment are determined less by a desire to 
control our surroundings. However, given the current impact of climate change and other 
anthropogenic harms, the notion of something as wild is a mere wish or fiction rather 
than as existing outside the influence of earth systems that are directly and indirectly 
influenced by human beings (e.g. Marris 2013).
Arguably, our ability to live symbiotically with and within nature is significant for the 
Anthropocene epoch, but it is affected by our deep institutional, cultural and theoretical 
commitments to anthropocentrism, which ultimately supports the growth and prosperity 
of the human species. There is much scholarship on the anthropocentric nature of our 
approaches to the environmental governance and law (e.g. Grear 2011). Such critiques 
have had wide-ranging impacts on ecological thought and scholarship. For example, 
Neimanis (2014) has criticised how we have come to conceive of water simply in terms of 
its use and as a resource for human consumption. This means that we have failed to realise 
that, by privileging it in relation to human bodies, we have ignored the vast network of 
relations that also need to be sustained by water for it to benefit us as well as nature in 
the long run.
Over the past two decades, a range of scholars have been working on developing 
alternative ontological explanations and narratives of matter and the human body as 
materially embodied (e.g. Abram 1996). However, instead of focusing on the ‘wild’ in an 
abstract sense, approaches more generally referred to as ‘new materialism’ have identified 
the potential of matter in the light of its alternative agency as subject rather than object 
(e.g. Coole & Frost 2010a), in order to generate new political and ethical commitments 
(Bennett 2010b). This intellectual movement is still not cohesive, although its various 
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strands emerged from a general criticism of the Cartesian–Newtonian way of identifying 
matter as inert and operating mechanistically. The Cartesian–Newtonian way of seeing 
matter means everything in the natural world has been ‘identifiably discrete’ and explained 
through a ‘linear logic of cause and effect’ (Coole & Frost 2010b: 7). 
In characterising matter in these narrow terms, scholarly traditions ranging from the 
sciences to cultural theory have come up with ‘predictable, controllable, and replicable’ 
conceptions of the natural world, which seem to ‘obey fundamental and invariable laws 
of motion’ (Coole & Frost 2010b: 8). The important point here is that seeing matter as 
inert has meant that ‘thought’ or human ‘agency’ has become the dominant motif for 
being able to claim superiority and domination over the natural world. Descartes’ cogito 
(the thinking subject) has become identified as ‘ontologically other than matter’, and is 
therefore seen superior to it (Coole & Frost 2010a: 8). 
Scholars challenging the orthodox view of matter as inert have also characterised 
its potential consequence for how we understand human beings and also the natural 
world in different terms.2 For example, Coole and Frost (2010a: 7), writing from a 
new materialist perspective, characterize critiques of Cartesian–Newtonian views of the 
world as being united by their ‘emphasis on materialization as a complex, pluralistic, 
relatively open process and their insistence that humans, including theorists themselves, 
be recognized as thoroughly immersed within materiality’s productive contingencies’. A 
wide range of scholars can be identified as materialists, including Hobbes and Spinoza, 
Deleuze and Serres, along with the Nobel Prize-winning novelist Le Clézio. Despite their 
shared concern in terms of breaking down traditional dichotomies and binaries such as 
human/non-human and rationality/matter, they approach their subject in different and 
complex ways. Hobbes, for instance, has built his approach to politics from a critique 
of the possibility of causality – that is, he posits that uncertainty in the way that x can 
determine y means that one cannot rely on causality, thus undermining the determinism 
that is associated with the Cartesian approach to the world of matter (see Frost 2008).
More recently, Barad (2012: 16) has offered a scientifically literate account of the potential 
of matter to surprise us beyond the dominant mechanical and causally driven approaches 
to it. Writing about the idea of nothingness, suggests that nothingness ‘is not absence, 
but the infinite plentitude of openness’. Barad’s conceptualization of the world of matter 
as being filled with possibilities, potential and vibrancy is dependent on it being seen as 
2 This literature is wide-ranging. This work draws on engagements with this subject from 
those who pursue phenomenology or adopt techniques of eco-psychology. On this subject 
and relationship see Vakoch and Castrillon (2014).
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‘ontologically indeterminate’, ‘radically open’ and with ‘infinite possibilities’ (2012: 16). 
The significance of Barad’s account of what she calls ‘mattering’ (as a dynamic process) is 
becoming increasingly relevant, but it is not necessarily unique. Related views are offered 
by other New Materialists. Bennett (2010b), for example, argues that matter is much 
more complex and porous – ‘lively’ – exhibiting more ‘agency’ than we have come to 
assume from it. From the viewpoint of such theorists, an emphasis on matter should be 
on its unpredictability and the indeterminability of processes in the natural world – with 
profound relevance for a range of human social processes: Bennett (2010b), for instance, 
identifies how ‘non-human materialities’ have agency, alluding to the impact that this 
ontological viewpoint could have on politics.
This ontologically driven approach provokes and encourages us to rethink our interactions 
with physical and biological matter and processes, and to explore new ways of seeing 
them. It separates us from other significant theoretical movements, like postmodernism, 
by emphasising that the world does not simply revolve ‘around words’ (Paulson 2009: 
216). An important consequence of thinking in this way is the possibilities to which it 
gives rise in broadening or reshaping debates about how we approach our relationship 
to the natural world. As an example, Michel Serres (1995), in his view on the new 
materialism, argues for a symbiotic partnership between human beings and the natural 
world. In this passage from the concluding paragraph of The Natural Contract, Serres 
contemplates his experience of what Ian Tucker (2011: 149) terms the ‘materiality of the 
human condition’:
That’s why I tasted joy during the earthquake that terrified so many 
people around me. All of a sudden the ground shakes off its gear: walls 
tremble, ready to collapse, roofs buckle, people fall, communications are 
interrupted, noise keeps you from hearing each other, the thin technological 
film tears, squealing and snapping like metal or crystal; the world, finally, 
comes to me, resembles me, all in distress. A thousand useless ties come 
undone, liquidated, while out of the shadows beneath unbalanced feet 
rises essential being, background noise, the rumbling world: the hull, the 
beam, the keel, the powerful skeleton, the pure quickwork, that which I 
have always clung to. I return to my familiar universe, my trembling space, 
the ordinary nudities, my essence, precisely to ecstasy.
Who am I? A tremor of nothingness, living in a permanent earthquake. Yet 
for a moment of profound happiness, the spasmodic Earth comes to unite 
herself with my shaky body. Who am I, now, for several seconds? Earth 
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herself. Both communing, in love she and I, doubly in distress, throbbing 
together, joined in a single aura. (Serres 1995: 123)
Here, Serres discusses the intense emotional experiences of being materially embodied. 
He describes his fears alongside the experiences of uncertainty, love and respect for 
the natural world. It isn’t so much that that matter, objects or the natural world are 
vibrant, present and open to change; human emotions and senses are also central to his 
appraisal or description of what is being experienced. Drawing inspiration from Serres, 
it is arguable that the way we understand our relationship with nature or matter more 
generally is not just through abstract conceptions using our thoughts and language, or in 
terms of new materialism’s extrapolation of the world as matter. Our senses, emotions and 
feelings are also critical to ways in which we experience and shape the world materially. 
Descartes’ influence on science, which Serres also fights against, is his separation of the 
world of thought from matter. In this vein, Damasio (1994) has famously argued that it 
is ‘emotions and feelings, along with the covert physiological machinery underlying them’ 
that ‘assist us with the daunting task of predicting an uncertain future and planning our 
actions accordingly’. He maintains that emotions, feelings and biological regulation all 
contribute to what is human reason. Serres states that certain kinds of emotions emerge 
from or exist only in our symbiotic integration in and with the natural world. If the 
world of matter is ever present, integrated, vibrant and ontologically indeterminate, as 
Barad (2012: 16) suggests, then our emotional makeup may also be more complex than 
Damasio suggests. Our emotional and sensorial makeup or experiences are therefore not 
as independent, isolated and capable of individualist appraisal as some cognitive theorists 
and psychologists describe (e.g. Prinz 2004). Abram (1996: 33) gives voice to this point 
when he states:
The world and I reciprocate one another. The landscape as I directly 
experience it is hardly a determinate object; it is an ambiguous realm that 
responds to my emotions and calls forth feelings from me in turn. 
Abram’s description of our engagement with matter suggests it can also elicit responses 
from us that are not just cognitive or innate, but emotionally embodied appraisals. The 
rest of this section discusses the emotional experiences of fear in a world of matter to 
help further illuminate our discussions of the connections between our experiences of the 
Anthropocene epoch and ecological justice.
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Deep fears in eco-philosophy
The emotion of fear is commonly discussed in the context of state politics and also in 
relation to violence and death (Schall 1996). In our relationship with the natural world, 
fear is often associated with the vulnerability we feel from experiences like darkness, 
flooding, landslides, potentially dangerous insects, or the possible spread of a virus (Pain 
& Smith 2008). Traditional reactions to fear have either been to avoid or to escape an 
object that threatens us, and to do whatever is necessary until we become – or feel like we 
have become – invulnerable (Svendsen 2008: 31). We have established similar responses 
to fear in relation to the natural world, by damming rivers, creating forest reserves to 
house wild animals, getting rid of spiders and generally managing or domesticating our 
natural surroundings. We exclude the natural or wild world from our collective lives, and 
in this way enable our escape from the object of fear. What we usually fear about nature 
are those things that have direct impacts on us as human beings and make us vulnerable, 
and as such are often of the kind of objects of fear that Massumi (1993) characterises as 
capable of enabling high-intensity emotions. The challenge with discussions of fear in 
general, and also in the context of our relationship with nature, is that we presume that 
someone experiencing it is likely to want to escape from the circumstances or situations in 
which they find themselves, or they are likely to avoid it altogether (Svendsen 2008). This 
reaction presumes that fear is a highly negative experience, and that its consequences if the 
object of the fear is realized are likely to impact violently on the integrity of the individual 
concerned. This explains why the common synonyms for fear – such as apprehension, 
dread, panic, terror and trepidation – point to extremes of individual responses or feelings.
The consequences of seeing fear as a high-intensity emotion, or as distinctly separate from 
the ongoing presence of the world of matter in our sensorial and emotional reality and 
consciousness, don’t acknowledge subtler, softer and more potent experiences of fear. These 
more nuanced emotional experiences include, for example, the likely and multifarious 
nature of the threats from climate change, biodiversity loss, ocean acidification and the 
many more huge environmental harms that are likely to emerge from breaches of what 
have popularly become known as planetary boundaries (see Rockstrom 2009). These 
harmful ecological events are different from those more sudden and impromptu events, 
such as a tsunami, which can immediately create victims. Their cause is also more likely 
to be multifarious. The idea of the Anthropocene epoch does not refer to tipping points, 
the loss of resilience or harm to earth systems, but it does suggest that collective human 
behaviour and our use of the natural environment are likely to bring us to these points 
more quickly.
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However, the often physically, spatially and temporally distant nature of these more 
gradual and subtle threats of the Anthropocene epoch makes them different from the 
experience that we would have if we were to come face-to-face with a certain kind of 
threatening object, like a spider. This doesn’t mean that breaches of planetary boundaries 
are unlikely to cause other more direct and severe natural conditions; these fears – 
although sometimes far removed from us – can be ‘dramatic gestures’ (cf. Little 2008: 94) 
or long-term waves of anxiety in our consciousness, and are often enlivened by smaller 
and localized experiences like flash flooding or the breakout of a virus. In this way, our 
experiences or feelings of helplessness around matter at the local level are intertwined with 
our responses to threats that are more distant – whether spatially or temporally. Research 
on fears or phobias about snakes shows they develop when someone is exposed to others 
who have experienced an adverse reaction to snakes at a particularly critical time (Mineka 
et al. 1984).
Another kind of nuanced yet challenging experience involves us emotionally embedding 
ourselves in, and experiencing the uncertainty, mystery or novel nature of, matter or 
the natural world – whether it be in a national park, on the high seas or in our own 
backyard. Damasio (2006) and others unpack a more deeply complex problem with 
common discussions of fear: the assumption that the world is experienced sensorially 
and emotionally, followed by cognitive appraisal. From this perspective, fear is the first 
reaction that someone has to certain things in the natural environment, which is then 
calibrated and contextualized cognitively (see Lockwood 2013). The problem with 
these liberal expressions of how emotions work is their claim that cognitive experiences 
can ultimately separate our experiences of the world of matter from emotional ones. 
In other words, the world of matter remains lifeless, ontologically determinate and not 
symbiotic in our experiences of fear and anxiety. This is not to suggest that we cannot or 
remain oblivious to the mental processing and social or cultural forces that shape how 
we experience nature. This experience of fear is more a recognition of the community of 
subjects and agents that are a part of our experience of the world and deeply embedded 
in it.
In this example, fear comes from how we engage or experience the object that enables 
our fear. Not everyone would feel fearful of not knowing what’s in the soil that we dig 
into in our backyards and, although the experience of fear is universal, our interpretation 
of the object of fear isn’t necessarily so – see Merleau-Ponty (1989: 189), discussing the 
cultural relativity of fear. Whereas we may all experience fear when face to face with a 
polar bear, this would not necessarily be a universal stimulus for everyone’s experience 
of fear. However, research suggests that our experiences of fear can be normalised by our 
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urban experiences (Little 2008). Urbanized experiences of nature or scientific approaches 
to objects can discipline us to avoid seeing variation, possibilities and potential in the 
way that matter asserts itself on our consciousness. Although Kahn and Hasbach (2013) 
would see this as our potential to experience the wild in everything we do and everywhere 
we go, the argument here is much wider, suggesting that science and rationality have also 
disciplined our emotions so that we avoid feeling anxious or threatened by uncertainty 
or the unknown because otherwise the world around us would fail to be controllable or 
domesticated.
In both these examples, subtle, distant and material experiences generate a kind of fear 
that is not commonly discussed when we talk about our fear of nature. What enables 
this fear and deepens its impact on us is arguably the loss of ‘control’ we experience from 
being spatially or temporally distant from the threat to us, or being uncertain about things 
we are likely to experience because we cannot rationally understand or analyse them. 
Like ‘wild’ experiences of nature, its arguable that fear also ‘fractures the foundations of 
modern conservation’ in that its removes our ability to control matter (Turner 2013: 35). 
However, in every sense, this is central to what the new materialism stands for, in that 
physical or physiological borders, inertness and the logic of cause and effect are all ideas 
that enable us to control rather than understand nature in its reciprocal relationship to us. 
What enables the fear we feel is the need to be completely integrated and embedded in 
our experiences with matter, to the extent that we appreciate rather than feel threatened 
by the fear we experience.
The idea that, with a broadening of our conception of matter, our emotional and fearful 
reaction towards the natural environment can change, is a different way of expressing 
what Kahn and Hasbach (2013) also argue regarding fear of the wild being primal to 
human beings. They maintain that fearing the wild is an important feature of rewilding 
us as a species (Kahn & Hasbach 2013). They don’t specify whether the emotion is 
physically, socially or biologically determined, but some scholars would disagree that it 
could be biological or ‘natural’. This is an important point: if certain kinds of experiences 
of fear are purely a cultural and social construction, then their reality is something we 
have to strive directly to achieve. This would be different from simply reorienting the way 
in which we appreciate the natural world and then expect our more subtle experiences of 
fear to emerge from this.
In this context, Svendsen (2008: 24) notes:
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[W]hat we fear, and how strongly, depends on our conceptions of the 
world, of what dangerous forces exist in it and what possibilities we have 
of protecting ourselves against them. Our knowledge and experience of 
emotions are not independent of the social context in which they occur.
Svendsen does not rule out that fear of the wild is primal or natural to the human species, 
but also argues that ‘fear’ can potentially be both biologically determined and culturally 
situated. It is possible, argue Coole and Frost (2010b: 27), to ‘accept social constructionist 
arguments while also insisting that the material realm is irreducible to culture of discourse’. 
This is the same as suggesting that the emotion of fear may be natural, but how and 
why we experience it can be either biological or culturally determined. This is important 
because if certain types of experiences of fear are culturally or socially determined, then 
whether matter’s vibrant force can affect our consciousness is also constructed rather than 
natural.
Yet, in making these points, it is easy to lose sight of the purpose behind Kahn and 
Hasbach’s (2013) argument, which is to revive our cultural engagement with wild nature 
by recognizing the role of fear in that process. The only problem here is whether we 
prefer to be ontologically correct or epistemologically normative. What is significant 
for this article is that if the objects we fear don’t have to have either immense or any 
immediate biological or real consequences for us, then we have to work out how they 
culturally shape the way we perceive them in such terms. Heidegger (2010: 178–83) 
elevated ‘anxiety’ to a basic or fundamental mood that recognised fear as limited, in that 
it was only possible with an identifiable threat. This suggests that, for Heidegger, the fears 
described above would be anxieties, as the immediacy of harm required by fear is much 
more time sensitive.
The main problem with subtle and nuanced fears, as opposed to high-intensity fear, is 
whether or not they are real. Although one might argue that this is more a philosophical 
than a real question, it is important because phenomenologists like Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1989) would argue that the gesture expressing fear is what is real rather than the 
emotion behind it (1989: 184). In such instances, the forgotten or more subtle fears 
discussed above would not necessarily have gestures or physical embodiments that one 
would traditionally associate with more intense fears. This isn’t an issue in relation to 
whether a person can feel fear, but still have care, compassion and a desire to conserve or 
preserve a natural environment. Kahn and Hasbach (2013) raise this in their discussion 
of rewilding the human species. Research on children’s experiences of bats in the zoo 
shows that they were both fearful of them and also cared for them. Although they would 
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not choose to sleep near the bats, the children said they would be bothered if they could 
not see or experience bats in a zoo or in the wild (Kahn and Hasbach 2013: 207–32) 
This study suggests that some people may react rather problematically to spiders, but 
that doesn’t mean their immediate response is to squash them or to eradicate the species 
completely. The significance of this point is that fear doesn’t require an immediate gesture 
or reaction to it for us to make the argument that it is real.
In this section, the article has argued that fear is an important emotion for understanding 
our relationship with the natural world. Traditional approaches to fear have privileged 
a particularly anthropocentric and liberal approach to nature, and don’t appear to have 
been predisposed to new materialist ontologies or interpretations of them that enable 
our emotions to be central to our role as the species dominating the Earth. Looking at 
fear from fresh perspectives directs us towards new ways of emotionally experiencing the 
natural world, as well as acknowledging that fear is an important way of dealing with the 
ecological challenges that are unique to the Anthropocene epoch. Although scholars have 
argued that the capacity to fear is important for rewilding the human species, this section 
has maintained that its importance is broader, in that it gives materiality credit in our 
emotional and cognitive experiences of the world around us. An understanding of why 
and how humans experience fear due to matter is critical for our symbiotic and integrated 
partnership with the natural world. The capacity to experience fear is important for 
understanding ecological justice, but context is also important in order to give expression 
to this idea. The next section explores this through the analysis of a painting.
A (re)interpretation of The Scream of Nature
In this section, the work of Edvard Munch in The Scream of Nature (see Figure 1) is 
discussed to describe the symbolic representation of fear in the context of experiences 
of ecological (in)justice. As will become apparent from the discussion that follows, the 
main character in this painting is not experiencing an immediate and high-intensity 
version of fear. It is therefore a useful symbolic depiction of fear, and suggests that there 
exists the possibility of (re)interpreting other common experiences in the natural world. 
Lockwood (2013) examines insects and our human relationship with them. He describes 
the centrality of grasshoppers and Salvador Dali’s fear of them, and their expressions of 
this in his art (2013: 6–8). This section argues that the expression of fear of reverberations 
of ecological injustice in the world of matter is central to Munch’s work in The Scream of 
Nature.
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Munch was a Norwegian painter whose work received world acclaim, and his Der Schrei 
der Natur, which translates as The Scream of Nature (hereafter The Scream) remains one 
of the most famous paintings in the world. The painting is also sometimes called The 
Cry (Lentz 2014). Munch was a prolific artist, with suggestions that he created ‘1,008 
Figure 1: Edvard Munch’s The Scream of Nature. This version appears in the Munch Museum in Oslo, Norway.
(WebMuseum at ibiblioPage: http://www.ibiblio.org/wm/paint/auth/munch/Image URL: http://www.ibiblio.org/
wm/paint/auth/munch/munch.scream.jpg. Licensed under Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons - https://com-
mons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Scream.jpg#/media/File:The_Scream.jpg)
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paintings, 4,443 drawings and 15,391 prints, as well as woodcuts, etchings, lithographs, 
lithographic stones, woodcut blocks, copperplates and photographs’ (Lentz 2014). He 
decided to become a painter in 1880 (Heller 1984: 11, 20). Munch’s life was filled 
with the sorrow of the passing of his mother, sister and others around him. He suffered 
from serious anxiety and hallucinations, as well as a range of other related forms of 
mental illness, and was one of the first people in Norway to receive shock therapy for 
his conditions (1984: Ch. 6). Munch’s life is characterised by Heller as one of ‘anarchic 
isolation and physical fragility’ (1984: 20). Isolation and deep contemplation through 
reading and writing also occupied much of his time, especially towards the second half 
of it. Munch is well known for his love of books – particularly on physics and higher 
mathematics (Prideaux 2005 at vii). He died in 1944 on his 80th birthday.
Munch is said to have commented that much of his works were ‘fragments of a great 
confession’, and that ‘his pictures fitted together ‘like the pages of a diary’ (Prideaux 
2005: vii). His approach to art was to recognise that sometimes a piece revealed itself 
more clearly after a number of efforts (2005: viii). For instance, he painted six versions 
of The Sick Child, which he saw as his best work, and he painted The Scream four times 
between 1883 and 1910. His approach to his art was therefore different from those of 
other artists, who recognised that a painting was the culmination of the performance of 
the capacity and skills of an artist. Munch celebrated the work of artists: to him, they 
alone were capable of ‘tearing off the mask of modern man to show his true face’ (2005: 
81). A commonly cited note from Munch’s own diary captures this: ‘[W]e should no 
longer paint interiors with people reading and women knitting, they should be people 
who live, breathe, feel, suffer and love.’ (Eggum 1992: 15) 
Munch’s substantive approach to his work is also reflected in the continuous evolution 
of his painting style. He was not a naturalist, a realist or an impressionist, and he never 
consistently adopted any other popular Norwegian approach to art. Munch’s abandonment 
of the schools of art was due to his obsession with subjectivity, or finding the ‘soul’ in the 
subject of his paintings. For instance, he abandoned realism because he saw it as being 
concerned only with the ‘shell of nature’ (Prideaux 2005: 81). His approach enabled him 
to make wide-ranging comparisons with artists from other schools. Whereas Leonardo 
da Vinci ‘studied the recesses of the body and dissected human cadavers’, through ‘self-
scrutiny’, Munch sought ‘to dissect what is the universal in the soul’ (Munch quoted in 
Prideaux 2005: 83).
Munch often painted a number of works around a particular theme. The Scream is 
embedded in his depiction of anxiety and despair. Included in this range, among others, 
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are works titled Despair and Anxiety (Wood 1992: 95–9). Munch used the background 
colours and themes in The Scream as the foundations for Despair and also Anxiety, which 
is why his works around that time are often used to interpret The Scream, as well as 
others in that collection. In The Scream, the background of the blood-red and yellow 
curves and arches dominates the landscape (see Figure 1). The gender-neutral ‘figure 
in the foreground, the landscape, and the sky all seem caught up in one great swirling 
motion’ (1992: 96). This feature of the painting is even more enhanced in a subsequent 
lithograph version. Messer (1985: 72) suggests that in the lithograph, ‘[T]he protagonist’s 
body contour is here dissolved and her identity remains establishable only in the negative, 
as the area corresponding to her presumed existence merges with that of the immediate 
environment.’ The background of the fjord used in The Scream is also the same one that 
is used in Despair and Anxiety, as well as other paintings created around the same period, 
although the ways in which the background is seamlessly embedded with the characters 
in the paintings differ significantly. In The Scream, the figure is deeply embedded into 
the background through the swirling motion of the brush. The figure is also separated 
from two people who appear in the background, although in another version of the same 
painting the characters separated from Munch are bowing their heads, and therefore more 
represented in the depiction of despair and anxiety than in the version shown in Figure 1.
Interpretation of  The Scream 
A variety of views exist on many aspects of this painting. Munch described the inspiration 
behind the painting:
I was walking along the road with two friends. The sun set. The sky became 
a bloody red. And I felt a touch of melancholy. I stood still, leaned on the 
railing, dead tired. Over the blue-black fjord and city hung blood and 
tongues of fire. My friends walked on and I stayed behind, trembling with 
fright. And I felt a great unending scream passing through nature. (Heller 
1984: 105) .
In a lithograph done on the motif of this painting back in 1895, Munch inscribed the 
following comment, which is also indicative of what he was experiencing: ‘I felt a great 
scream pass through nature’ (Wood 1992: 96).
Despite Munch’s own views about the painting, a range of interpretations of this work 
point to the actual despair, turmoil and anxiety that he was experiencing at that time, due 
to his experiences with mental illness. Prideaux (2005: 137) suggests that the painting 
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has come to represent the ‘dilemma of modern man, a visualization of Nietzsche’s cry, 
“God is dead, and we have nothing to replace him”’. More simply, Jones (2012) describes 
the background and the distortion in the surroundings as representing the despair, fear 
and anxiety that the figure is projecting on its view of the world around it. The idea that 
Munch is portraying despair and anxiety, which is a personal, subjective and yet possibly 
universal depiction of the human condition, emerges from the suggestion that he was in 
fact reflecting on his sister Lara’s incarceration in a mental institution on the other side of 
the path and the fjord. The figure, which is often suggested to be that of Munch himself, 
is also caught up in the experiences he had with mental illness.
An important feature of The Scream is the way in which Munch has managed to embed 
and integrate the figure into the landscape itself using a combination of swirls and the 
distortion in the figure, which aligns with that of the natural background. This style 
helps to separate the role of the figure used in The Scream and that in another painting of 
Munch’s referred to as Despair. In Despair, the same background colours and structures 
are used, but the distinctly male figure appears markedly separate from his surroundings 
because this is a more traditional representation of a person. As a result, it is suggested 
that in Despair, ‘the background operates as a reflection of the mood of the person in 
the foreground’ (Wood 1992: 95).  This is the case in Despair rather than The Scream 
because of the separation Munch has forced on the painting between the individual and 
the background in which he is embedded. Whereas in Despair nature is represented as 
the reflection of the figure’s mood, this is not the case in The Scream, where the figure is 
completely embedded and integrated into nature itself.
Interestingly, much of the interpretation of Munch’s work relates to it being a work 
of introspection built around his mental condition rather than a commentary on the 
figure’s engagement in and appreciation of our experience of nature. This is surprising, 
given Munch’s own comments, and it appears from works done on Munch that he was 
predisposed to critical readings of science, which is consistent with the approach of new 
materialism. Prideaux (2005: 81) comments that he wanted ‘no part of the idea that 
science alone could, by revealing the nature of things, make the mechanical sequences 
of the universe omnipotent’. This comment sits significantly alongside Munch’s more 
general critique of art as being concerned with the form things take rather than the 
soul. Echoing this point, but in the context of science, Munch commented that, ‘[T]hey 
[referring to scientists] have found bacteria, but not what they consist of ’ (cf. Prideaux 
2005: 81).
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The painting is as much a commentary on our materially embodied existence as it is about 
the incapacity of some to see, hear and be deeply integrated into their surroundings and 
the natural world. The figure of the person is embroiled in the story the natural world is 
seeking to tell by its representation through the swirls used to also capture the vibrant and 
extraordinarily colourful nature around it. The clothes on the figure are represented in the 
same colour as the river behind it, but in a way that suggests Munch and the river flow 
into one another. The distortions in the head of the figure and the opening of its mouth, 
which are central to the expressions on the face, capture the power of the scream of 
nature – not just on the mood, but on the total being of the figure. This suggests that the 
scream of nature and its power are not ordinary. This view is also further enhanced by the 
blood-red colour that appears in the sky (rather than the river, for instance), representing 
the stratosphere, which is the highest point on earth that human beings can visually 
experience.
This discussion can be extended to appreciate the normative aspect of the work. The 
orange and red in the sky are metaphors, and therefore suggestive of nature’s blood that 
we have been responsible for shedding. In this painting, the disturbance, violence and 
sometimes chaotic presence of nature in our lives, which leads to our fearful posture and 
reaction to it, comes from the swirling lines, the appearance of the movement of the red 
colour along the railings that the figure is standing next to, and the appearance of the 
capacity of the noise and the acoustic forces to distort the body of the figure itself. Most 
significantly, the severe reaction of the figure in the painting to the scream of nature 
suggests that the extraordinary nature of this experience. Importantly, not everyone feels 
the impact of the scream of nature – in the first version of Munch’s The Scream, the other 
human personalities in the image are not responding to anything. This interpretation of 
the painting leaves us with the distinct impression that the ‘subject’ in the painting is not 
just the figure but also the natural surroundings. Arguably, the scream ‘passing through 
nature’ is the real subject of this painting. 
The positioning of the other two characters in the painting, who are well dressed and 
appear to represent the aristocracy, suggests that whatever has caused the scream or the 
scream itself is of no concern to them, whereas Munch’s figure is distorted and experiences 
intense fear anxiety. The representation of wealth and the economy in the aristocracy 
distances the figures. The fact that the two people behind the main figure (supposedly 
of Munch himself ) cannot hear the scream of nature is itself part of the experience of 
injustice that the painting depicts. Additionally, the swirls through the painting connect 
– literally and also metaphorically, by not imposing borders or barriers – the past and the 
present, the local and universal, and the mild and severe experiences of nature itself. The 
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scream of nature reverberating through the landscape and the figure itself is represented 
not just as a single incident, scream or observation, but as ‘something’ that has been 
continuously building to become the symbolic representation in the painting of injustice 
that the figure feels so strongly. 
This section has argued that, despite alternative interpretations of The Scream, the work of 
Munch is about matter, materiality, and the human emotional engagement with it rather 
than cognition and the mental projections by the figure of his or her mood. Significantly, 
it is also about the symbiotic engagement of human beings with the natural world. As 
such, it can be read as a powerful depiction of the capacity of the natural world to protest 
about its experience of injustice. Although one could argue that the painting has nothing 
else to say other than the fact that the scream flows through nature, this is not the case 
when the various nuances in the work are analysed with an eye to justice. Munch manages 
to convey to the viewer the emotional experience of injustice against the natural world. 
Most importantly, the painting conveys the potential fear that one will experience should 
nature’s scream emerge from the injustices we commit against the natural world.
Analysis and Conclusion
In the early 1990s, the idea of intergenerational equity defined and gave creative impetus 
and direction to scholarship on international environmental law and politics (Brown 
Weiss 1989). The concept has morphed into something larger and broader: the idea of 
environmental justice, which is concerned with the  just access of present and future 
generations to environmental goods. The problem that new approaches to materialism 
seek to highlight is our near-universal assumption that the world of matter needs us, or its 
destiny is fully understood and determined by us. It is arguable that, in the Anthropocene 
epoch, symbiosis rather than individualism better explains what is going on. In this sense, 
it arguable that the concept of ecological justice is a less anthropocentric doctrine to use 
in understanding our symbiotic relationship with the natural world. This doesn’t mean 
that we forget about human beings in our normative dealings with the environment, but 
rather that we have to assess our significance in a new light. Serres (1995: 16) refers to 
human beings as the ‘dense tectonic plates of humanity’, to distinguish us as materially 
embodied species from what we have come to know as ‘man as an individual or subject’. 
Even from this simple view of human beings, we can argue that we are deeply embedded 
and integrated into experiences of ecological justice and injustice. 
This is certainly what The Scream suggests, and a reinterpretation of this painting using 
ontologies that don’t have human beings as the dominant feature in the world makes this 
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more apparent. The Scream also makes the experience of ecological injustice the subject 
of the painting by vividly portraying the flow of the scream through both the entire 
landscape and the main figure in the painting. The anomaly is the two characters on the 
bridge, who are at a distance from the main figure and don’t experience the vibrant force 
of the scream. However, the discussion in the first section of this article indicated that the 
subtle and nuanced experiences of fear are central to the rewilding of the human species, 
recognizing that we occupy an ‘ineluctably material world’ (Coole & Frost 2010b: 1). 
However, Coole and Frost make the point that, ‘for the most part we take … materiality 
for granted, or we assume that there is little of interest to say about it’ (2010b: 1). The fear 
of someone else’s loss is not always a high priority, unless it is somehow directly connected 
to our own experiences. We may even seek to do economic cost-benefit analysis as to 
whether we should protect nature for the present or future generations ( Baumgartner 
et al. 2012). Returning to the paradox in The Scream, the two aristocratic and wealthier 
people on the bridge are not susceptible to the same experiences of matter as the main 
figure, who is deeply impacted by the scream to which they are witness.
Baudot (2010: 6) argues that art can have instrumental, intrinsic and extrinsic effects on 
international politics. This article maintains that fear in human beings is an important 
feature of the experiences of and concerns for achieving ecological justice. It is also 
important for understanding the deeply symbiotic rather than liberal relationship that we 
have with the natural world. A (re)interpretation of The Scream is an important step in this 
process, by drawing on its popularity as a piece of art to inspire people to reconceptualize 
their relationship with the natural world. Most importantly, it has intrinsic value in 
that the ‘charismatic power of the work of art itself ’ can ‘enoble and inspire political 
thinking and action’ (Baudot 2010: 2). However, this article has also shown that The 
Scream makes an extrinsically valuable contribution to understanding the place of the 
human species in a world of matter. It helps us to explore how fear emerges not just 
from the individual’s experience of an object that is apart from them; rather, the human 
is part of and integrated into the experiences of nature. This is a critical and important 
argument that the work of Munch describes vividly once it is reinterpreted. The painting 
can arguably sit alongside Serres’ (1995) The Natural Contract as a contribution to our 
understanding of eco-philosophy by combining a critique of scientific rationality with a 
new approach to the ontological in cultural and social philosophy.
111Afshin Akhtar-Khavari
References
Abram, David (1996). The Spell of the Sensuous. New York: Vintage.
Barad, Karen (2012). What is the Measure of Nothingness? Infinity, Virtuality, Justice: 100 
Notes, 100 Thoughts. Kassel, Germany: Hatje Cantz. 
Baudot, B. (2012). Art in international relations. Retrieved 20 May 2015 from 
http://69.89.31.101/,triglavc/wpcontent/uploads/2011/04/art_relations1.pdf.
Baumgartner, Stefan et al. (2012). ‘Economic Analysis of Trade-Offs between Justices’. 
Intergenerational Justice Review, 1: 4–9.
Bennett, Jane (2010a). Vibrant Matter. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Bennett, Jane (2010b). ‘A Vitalist Stopover on the Way to a New Materialism’, in Diane 
Coole and Samantha Frost (eds), New Materialism: Ontology, Agency, and Politics. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, pp. 47–69.
Bosselmann, Klaus (2008). Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance. 
Aldershot: Ashgate.
Brown Weiss, Edith (1989). In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common 
Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational.
Coole, Diane & Frost, Samantha (eds) (2010a). New Materialism: Ontology, Agency, and 
Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Coole, Diane & Frost, Samantha (eds) (2010b). ‘Introducing the New Materialism’, in 
Diane Coole and Samantha Frost (eds), New Materialism: Ontology, Agency, and Politics. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 1–46.
Crutzen, Paul J. (2002). ‘Geology of Mankind’. Nature, 415, doi: 10.1038/415023a.
Damasio, Antonio (2006). Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Eggum, Arne (1992). ‘Edvard Munch: A Biographical Background’, in Mara-Helen Wood 
(ed.). Edvard Munch: The Frieze of Life. Harvard, MA: Yale University Press, pp. 15–37.
112 Naveiñ Reet: Nordic Journal of Law and Social Research (NNJLSR) No.6 2015
Frost, Samantha (2008). Lessons from a Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflections on Ethics 
and Politics. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Gonzalez, Carmen G. (2012). ‘Environmental Justice and International Environmental 
Law’, in Shawkat Alam, Jahid Hossain, Tareq Bhuiyan, M. Chowdhury and Erika Techera 
(eds), Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law. New York: Routledge, pp. 
77–98.
Grear, Anna (2011). ‘The Vulnerable Living Order: Human Rights and the Environment 
in a Critical and Philosophical Perspective’. Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 
2(1): 23–44.
Heidegger, Martin (2010). Being and Time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press.
Heller, Reinhold (1984). Munch: His Life and Work. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Jones, Jonathan (2012). ‘Edvard Munch’s The Scream Analysed – Interactive’. Retrieved 20 
March 2015 from http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/interactive/2012/may/03/
edvard-munch-scream-interactive.
Kahn, Peter H. & Hasbach, Patricia H. (2013). ‘The Rewilding of the Human Species’, 
in Peter H. Kahn & Patricia H. Hasbach (eds), The Rediscovery of the Wild. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, pp. 207–32.
Lentz, Merryl (2014). ‘Analysis of The Scream by Edvard Munch’. Retrieved 20 March 
2015 from http://www.finearts360.com/index.php/analysis-of-the-scream-by-edvard-
munch-7398.
Little, Jo (2008). ‘Nature, Fear and Rurality’, in Rachel Pain & Susan J. Smith (eds), Fear: 
Critical Geopolitics and Everyday Life. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 87–97.
Lockwood, John (2013). The Infested Mind: Why Humans Fear, Loathe, and Love Insects. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marris, Emma (2013). Rambunctious Garden: Saving Nature in A Post-Wild World. 
London: Bloomsbury.
113Afshin Akhtar-Khavari
Massumi, Brian (1993). ‘Everywhere You Want to Be: Introduction to Fear’, in Massumi 
B (ed.), The Politics of Everyday Fear. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 
3–39.
McKibben, Bill (1989). The End of Nature. New York: Random House.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1989). Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith. Baton 
Rouge, FL: Florida University Press.
Messer, Thomas M. (1985). Edvard Munch. New York: Harry M. Abrams.
Mineka, S., Davidson, M., Cook, M. & Keir, R. (1984). ‘Observational conditioning of 
snake fear in Rhesus monkeys’. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 93: 355–72.
Neimanis, Astrida (2014). ‘Alongside the Right to Water, a Posthumanist Feminist 
Imaginary’. Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 5(1): 5–24.
Pain, Rachel & Smith, Susan J. (2008). Fear: Critical Geopolitics and Everyday Life. 
Aldershot: Ashgate.
Paulson, William (2009). ‘The Natural Contract: Governance and Citizenship in Real 
Time’. Western Humanities Review 63(3): 118–35.
Prideaux, Sue (2005). Edvard Munch. Behind the Scream. Harvard, MA: Yale University 
Press.
Prinz, Jesse J. (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotions. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Robin, L. & Steffen, Will (2007). ‘History for the Anthropocene’. History Compass 5: 
1694–1719.
Rockstrom, Johan et al. (2009). ‘Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating 
Space for Humanity’ Ecology and Society 14(2): 32.
Schall, James V. (1996). At the Limits of Political Philosophy. Washington, DC: Catholic 
University of America Press.
114 Naveiñ Reet: Nordic Journal of Law and Social Research (NNJLSR) No.6 2015
Schlosberg, David (2009). Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and 
Nature. New York: Oxford University Press.
Serres, Michel (1995). The Natural Contract. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press.
Steffen, Will, Crutzen, Paul J. & McNeill, John R. (2007). ‘The Anthropocene: Are 
Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?’ Ambio 36(8): 614–21.
Svendsen, L. (2008). A Philosophy of Fear. London: Reaktion Books.
Tucker, Ian (2011). ‘Sense and the Limits of Knowledge: Bodily Connections in the 
Work of Serres’. Theory Culture Society 28: 149–60.
Turner, Jack (1996). The Abstract Wild (1996).
Turner, Jack (1998). ‘In Wildness is the Preservation of the World’, in J Baird Callicott 
and Michael P. Nelson, The Great New Wilderness Debate. Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, pp. 617–34.
Turner, Jack (2013). ‘The Wild and the Self ’ in Peter H. Kahn and Patricia H. Hasbach 
(eds), The Rediscovery of the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 27–50.
Whitehead, Mark (2014). Environmental Transformations. New York: Routledge.
Wood, Mara-Helen (ed.) (1992). Edvard Munch: The Frieze of Life. Harvard, MA: Yale 
University Press.
